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strike for a dosed shop. Or in other words even after the advent of
N.I.R.A. and its much publicized Section 7a, a strike for a dosed shop
should continue to be legal in Ohio. WILLIAM K. THOMAS
USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO PREVENT BREACH OF CONTRACT
The Hamilton Tailoring Company, of Cincinnati, Ohio, is a corpo-
ration employing about two hundred and fifty employees, engaged in the
manufacture of clothing. Shortly after the N.I.R.A. was invalidated the
employees evinced dissatisfaction with their wages and working condi-
tions. While a strike was imminent the company presented to the em-
ployees a "contract of employment" which substantially all of them were
induced to sign. No agreement on the question of hours and wages
could be reached between the employer and the employees and on
October 2, 1935, the members of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union within the shop, numbering about one hundred in all, voted to
strike. The company filed a petition in the Common Pleas Court of
Hamilton County for an injunction prohibiting the defendant union
from "doing any act calculated to cause any employee to breach his
contract of employment" and for other similar relief. The court denied
the injunction on the grounds that the defendants were engaged in a
legal strike and that the employment contract was void for want of
mutuality in that during the first six months of its duration the employer
had the right to terminate the same while an equivalent right was not
vested in the employee. Hamilton Tailoring Company v. Cincinnati
Joint Board of tmalgamated Clothing Workers of .4meica, et al., 4
Ohio Op. 295 (1936).
After this opinion was released but before the making of the journal
entry the company drew up other contracts with its employees abro-
gating the original ones and attempting to meet the objection of the
trial court by giving either party the right to terminate the agreement
on fifteen days' notice. The case was then taken on appeal to the
Appellate Court of the First District where the plaintiff company was
permitted over objection to file supplemental petitions setting forth the
new contract and alleging that the defendants had instituted a secondary
boycott against the plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the original peti-
tion in the lower court. The Appellate Court reversed the holding of
the trial court and enjoined all persuasion tending toward a breach of
those contracts. It held both contracts valid without comment upon the
law involved in the case. That court also granted a sweeping injunction
against the secondary boycott.
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The case was taken to the Supreme Court both on motion to certify
and as of right. In that court the motion to certify was denied since,
it was stated, no question of great public interest was presented. On
the appeal as of right the defendants contended that the injunction vio-
lated their right of free speech as set out in Article x, Section ii of the
Ohio Constitution, and that the admission of the supplemental petitions
was a new cause of action originating in the Appellate Court contrary
to Article 4, Section 6, and that if the case originated in the Appellate
Court they were entitled to an appeal as of right under that section.
The appeal was denied on the ground that no debatable constitutional
question was involved. On petition for rehearing in which the last con-
tention was stressed, the Court affirmed their former decision stating
that. no new issue was presented. Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Cincinnati
Joint Board of 4malgamated Clothing Workers of America, et al., 132
Ohio St. 259 (1937).
Only two of the several interesting legal questions involved in this
decision will be discussed in this comment. They are (i) the correct-
ness and significance of the holding of the Appellate Court that the
contracts involved are valid to an extent that the peaceful persuasion of
the employees of the plaintiff to break such contracts is subject to injunc-
tion and (2) the propriety of the action of the Appellate Court in
permitting the plaintiffs to file amended petitions containing a totally
different contract from that under consideration in the trial court.
According to the present status of labor law it is legal for a body of
men to band together into a labor union and to strike when a legitimate
trade dispute exists. The LaFrance Electrical Construction and Sapply
Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 8,
et-al., io8 Ohio St. 61, 14o N.E. 899 (1928). It is also equally well
settled that a union may use peaceful persuasion to further their ends
provided that end is legitimate. LaFrance Elc. Co. v. Brotherhood,
supra, and note in 2 Ohio St. L.J. 301 (1936). A labor union may
induce the breach of contract at will with impunity but if the contract be
for a term, persuasion-peaceful or otherwise-tending toward that
end, is subject to injunction. Parker v. Bricklayers' Union, 10 Ohio
Dec. Rep. 458, 21 Bull. 223 (1889). Peaceful picketing has been held
subject to injunction if utilized to induce a breach of a term contract.
Fulworth Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, et al., 15 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 353, 27 Ohio Dec. 675 (1913).
Thus the action of the Appellate Court in enjoining the defendants from
peacefully persuading the employees of the plaintiff to quit their employ-
ment was consonant with previous Ohio decisions.if the contracts in-
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volved are considered to be binding contracts for a term. - That these
are binding contracts is open to some question. In paragraph (b) of the
contracts of employment' it will be noted that there is vested in the
employer complete control over the amount of wages that an employee
may earn. Can a contract embodying such a provision be considered to
have that mutuality of obligation necessary to a binding agreement? In
the case of Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682,
227 N.Y.S. 258 (1928), the New York court looked behind a contract
drawn to support an injunction and declared it void for want of mutu-
ality saying: "Whatever the status of the contract in law, the provisions
'Contracts of Employment
Contract of Sept. 6, 1935.
This agreement entered into this* * by and between The Hamilton Tailoring Com-
pany, first party, and * * * second party, Witnesseth:
(a) That said first party hereby agrees to employ said second party for a period of
six months from the above date, and said second party agrees to work for said first party
during such period and to render faithful and efficient services to the satisfaction of said
first party.
(b) In case said first party shall not have sufficient work for all employees because
of any stoppage of work, dullness of trade, damage to its plant, or other cause beyond its
control, it shall distribute its work among its employees as it may deem best, giving special
consideration to such employees as may be operating under agreements similar to this; and
said first party shall pay said second party only for work actually done by him.
(c) It is mutually agreed that the same basic rates as are now paid by said first party
shall continue during the life of this agreement unless modified by agreement of the
parties hereto.
(d) Said second party hereby agrees that he is not now, and will not during the life
of this agreement or of any renewal hereof, become a party to any agreement the terms of
which conflict with this agreement; and that he will in all respects conform with the
policies, rules, and instructions of said first party and with no rules or authority in
conflict therewith.
(e) It is further mutually agreed that at the expiration of this agreement, it shall
continue until terminated by either party by i5 days' notice; provided, however, that said
first party shall have a right at any time to discharge said second party for cause, such as
disloyalty, breach of shop rules, incompetence, lack of diligence, insubordination or breach
of the terms of this agreement.
Contract entered into subsequent to decision of trial court.
This agreement made and entered into this * * * between The Hamilton Tailoring
Company of Cincinnati, Ohio, Party of the First Part, and * * of * * * Party of the
Second Part, Witnesseth:
(a) That First Party hereby employs Second Party for a term and period of six
months from date and Second Party hereby agrees to work for said Party of the First
Part for the said term and period of six months from date. In consideration of the fore-
going covenants, said First Party agrees to pay to Second Party the same basic rate as is
now paid by said First Party to said Second Party and said basic rate of pay shall continue
during the life of this contract unless modified by agreement of the parties hereto.
(b) Should First Party, because of insufficiency or stoppage of work, dullness of
trade, or other circumstances beyond its control, be unable to employ Second Party full
time, Second Party shall be paid for such time as he is actually employed, or, if employed
on a piece work basis, for such work as he actually performs.
(c) Either party may cancel or terminate this agreement by giving the other party
fifteen days (z5 days) notice in writing of the intention so to do.
(d) Any prior and/or existing contract between the parties is for valuable consid-
eration hereby rescinded.
(e) In witness whereof the Parties have signed this agreement in duplicate this
1 * * x935.
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* * * are inequitable." It was further stated, "Where an employee
abandons all right to leave the service of his employer, whereas the
employer reserves practically entire freedom to discharge him, there is
no compensating consideration." Since the power to limit the amount
of work that an employee might receive, and as a consequence the
amount of his wages is almost equivalent to the power to discharge, it is
submitted that this celebrated case furnishes excellent authority upon
which to base the conclusion that the contracts in the case at bar are
void for want of mutuality. This conclusion is further strengthened
by the fact that in the LaFrance case, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court
evinced the same tendency to look behind a spurious labor contract. It is
obvious that the primary purpose of these contracts was to prevent the
employees of the Tailoring Company from being called out on strike.
A necessary corollary of this objective was to prohibit unionization of
the plaintiff's employees, for to what purpose is unionization in such a
situation if the employee may not subsequently engage in a strike? This
result directly contravenes the avowed public policy of this state as set
forth in our statute outlawing yellow-dog contracts (quoted below).
Ohio G.C. 6241-1. This furnishes a further reason why these contracts
should have been declared invalid.
Aside from this, clause (d) of the first contract seems clearly invalid
under the yellow-dog statute. In that clause it is stated, "Said Second
Party hereby agrees that he is not now, and will not during the life of
this agreement or of any renewal hereof, become a party to any agree-
ment the terms of which conflict with this agreement; and that he will
in all respects conform with the policies, rules, and instructions of said
First Party and with no rules or authority in conflict there with." In
Ohio G.C. 6241-1 it is stated, "Every undertaking * * - whereby
(a) either party to such contract or agreement undertakes or promises
not to join, become, or remain a member of any labor organization
* * * is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and wholly
void." While this point was not raised directly it is submitted that the
Appellate Court has done much toward emasculating the yellow-dog
statute by declaring the first contract to be a valid labor agreement
without mention .of this daiise.
While not as important from the standpoint of labor law, the action
of the Appellate Court in permitting the filing of the supplemental peti-
tions setting forth the contract entered into subsequent to the decision in
the court below seems no less questionable. The Constitution of Ohio as
amended in 1912 pr9vides that the parties to an equity action are
entitled to a trial de novo in the Appellate Court. Ohio Const., Article
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4, Section 6; Kirkias v. Fountas, lo9 Ohio St. 553, 143 N.E. 129
(1924). Thus the parties have the same right to file supplemental
petitions in the Appellate Court as they have in the trial court. McCor-
mick v. McCormick, 124 Ohio St. 440, 179 N.E. 286 (i93i). The
Ohio statute provides generally that either party to an action, on com-
pliance with prescribed conditions, "may be allowed to file a supple-
mental petition, answer, or reply alleging facts material to the case
which occurred since the filing of the former petition, answer, or reply."
Ohio G.C. 11,368. Cases discussing this section have regarded the
supplemental petition as only ancillary to the original petition. It may
never be used to set up a new cause of action. Gibbon v. Dougherty,
et al., io Ohio St. 365 (1859); Hiler v. Hiler, 14 Ohio App. 174
(1921); McGuire i,. Louis Snider Paper Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 392, 4 N.P.
262 (1897). Thus the point narrows down to the question whether
the filing of the supplemental petitions was merely bringing before the
court matters incident to the original cause of action or whether the new
contract and the breach thereof constitute a new cause of action. The
limited scope of this paper necessarily prohibits an extended discussion of
the nature of a "cause of action." Whether we accept the view advanced
by Pomeroy that the cause is limited and determined by a primary right,
Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5 th Ed., 1929) 526-548; Hahl v. Sugo,
169 N.Y. 1o9, 62 N.E. 135 (i9oi); or whether we consider it to be
a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more right or rights of
action, Clark, The Code Cause of Iction, 33 Yale L.J. 82o (1924);
Craft Refrigerating Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551 ,
29 Adt. 76 (1893), it is difficult to consider the cause of action available
to the Tailoring Company in this instance to be other than a group of
rights of action arising out of their legal right to be protected in their
contractual relation with their employees created by the contract on
which the suit was originally brought. If this be true then only actual
or contemplated infringements upon that legal right might form the
subject of supplemental petitions in either the Trial or the Appellate
Court. The acts of the defendants tending to induce a breach of a
contract distinct from that involved in the original action cannot be
classed as incident to a cause of action arising out of that previous con-
tractual relationship. See MeGuire v. Louis Snider Paper Co., supra.
Thus it would seem that the Appellate Court, by allowing the filing of
the supplemental petition, permitted a new action to be instituted in that
court contrary to Article 4, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution which
provides that the Appellate Court shall have original jurisdiction only as
to the five extraordinary writs, and Appellate jurisdiction in the trial
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of chancery cases. It may be well to point out that the defendants were
little prejudiced by this action on the part of the Appellate Court. From
the opinion of the trial judge it is apparent that a proceeding based upon
the substituted contract would have resulted in a decision adverse to
them. This, however, cannot justify unorthodox procedure.
According to the decision in this case a labor organization may take
no active measures, such as picketing, etc., to induce employees to leave
their employment in a plant in which they are bound by one of these
so-called "contracts." Furthermore, if the employees should become
members of the union the issuance of a strike order would be subject to
injunction. Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244
(N.Y., 1916), and cases there cited. If the union should succeed in
organizing the employees and calling them out on strike the union
itself would probably be subject to an action at law for damages done
the employer as a result of the breached contract. Parker v. Bricklayers'
Union, supra, and see note in 3 Ohio St. L.J. 237 (1937). Under the
second contract one loophole seems to be left, although it is of doubtful
value. While that agreement is ostensibly for a term it is terminable by
either party at fifteen days' notice. It would seem probable, then, that
no action would lie against a labor organization for inducing an employee
to give notice and quit at the end of the fifteen-day period. This would
follow logically from the accepted proposition that it is not illegal to
induce another to do a legal act. LaFrance Elec. Co. v. Brotherhood,
supra. The first contract contains no such loophole, however, and a
general utilization of an agreement of that sort will effectively tie the
hands of labor groups.
As was previously stated the Supreme Court refused a motion to
certify thereby declaring that no question of great public interest was
involved in this case. Some idea of the importance ascribed to the case
by labor organizations may be gathered from the fact that twenty dif-
ferent groups joined as amici curiae to present briefs to the Supreme
Court. Yet the court held that it was not of sufficient public interest to
warrant a hearing. It is submitted that this evasion of a question of
vital import to every employer and employee, especially in view of the
present trend toward unionization of industry, is indefensible.
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